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Abstract: In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth 
and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and 
shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-
mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism 
in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspond-
ingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how 
propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a 
mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work 
on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persis-
tent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil 
the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering 
algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (im-
plicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them 
across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. 
The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental 
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content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are 
applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).  
Keywords: Propositions; causal-mentalist view; cluster analysis; game 
theory; perception algorithms; Platonism; symbol grounding. 
1. Introduction 
 Propositions play several theoretical roles. They are thought of, for ex-
ample, as the primary bearers of truth and falsity, the relata of logical 
relations such as entailment, the objects of certain intentional states such 
as belief, and contents of linguistic acts such as assertion (McGrath and 
Frank 2018; Briggs and Jago 2012). There is disagreement, however, as to 
the nature of the posited entity that performs these roles. Platonist, possi-
ble-worlds, deflationary, and naturalist accounts compete. 
 We argue for one form of naturalist theory of propositions. In our view, 
propositions are non-abstract, structured entities, and we identify them 
with certain types of persistent mental entities created and coordinated by 
cognitive algorithms common to different minds. Work in Artificial Intelli-
gence has discovered the kind of algorithms needed to create such mental 
entities, while the causal story of how they are created and work in game 
theory has shown how such entities can be coordinated across different 
minds. 
 We take no particular position on the nature of the mental, such as 
whether it is reducible to the physical. The mental is simply identified as 
whatever in humans plays the usual roles of intentionality, content, 
thought, perception and direction of action. 
2. Directions for a theory of propositions 
 In this section we list several specifications which our theory of proposi-
tions will attempt to meet. Some are uncontroversial and some less so. We 
give brief reasons in their favour but cannot consider all the arguments of 
those who have taken different paths. Our aim is to motivate a causal-men-
talist approach and to situate it in the spectrum of theories of propositions. 
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• A theory of propositions will offer a clear answer as to the meta-
phyical nature of whatever is identified as propositions 
 A theory should be clear as to whether it takes propositions to be Pla-
tonist abstract entities and if so which ones, or types of sentences and if so 
how the tokens are united into types (since a type is only identified by the 
properties that unite it), or mental entities and if so which ones exactly, or 
is a deflationary theory and if so what is left after deflation, and so on. 
 To defend a non-deflationary, or realist, theory of propositions is not 
necessarily to posit entities which are primary truth-bearers and to which 
thought or predication has some (external) relation. That way of speaking 
could concede too much to the Fregean Platonist view of propositions that 
once dominated the field. What the alternative might be, however, needs 
to become clear in the outcome. It will need to be explained how the entities 
to be posited accomplish the roles which propositions traditionally play. 
• It will explain both the public, objective aspect and the mental 
aspect of propositions 
 Propositions are shareable and public in that two or more people can 
accept, believe, assert or communicate the same proposition. That is the point 
of them. Any account of the nature of propositions should attempt to explain 
those facts. Prima facie, a mentalist account of propositions could find this 
difficult, as mental entities are not public, nor do they appear to be shareable. 
 On the other hand, ‘any [view] according to which propositions represent 
things as being a certain way and so have truth conditions in virtue of their 
very natures and independently of minds and languages is in the end com-
pletely mysterious and so unacceptable’ (King 2009, 261; Pickel 2017). The 
problem of what propositions are does not arise from questions in physical 
or biological science. The roles played by propositions arise from humans 
attributing meaning to language, from language inducing thoughts, and 
from similar pieces of language reliably inducing similar thoughts and be-
haviours in different persons. Those explananda essentially involve the men-
tal, so a theory of propositions must explain the relations of propositions to 
the mental. That is a prima facie difficulty for theories that propositions 
are to be identified with non-mental entities such as Platonist abstracta, 
sets of possible worlds, states of affairs or sentences. Our approach is thus 
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in accordance with the naturalist trends in cognitive science that have 
tended to supplant Fregean anti-psychologism in the last hundred years. 
We comment on Frege below. 
• It will explain compositionality: how the nature and roles of a 
proposition are a function of (or at least relate to) the nature and 
roles of its terms 
 A well-formed sentence, like ‘John is tall’, surely expresses some 
thought. An ill-formed string of symbols, like ‘!@#$%’, does not. Something 
must account for this difference. Likewise, something must account for the 
fact that ‘John is tall’ resembles ‘John is short’ in one way and ‘Sue is tall’ 
in a different way. The structural features of propositions account for the 
difference (Duncan 2018). 
 To think of propositions as structured entities is to think of them as 
complex entities having an ordered relation among their parts or constitu-
ents. The ordered relation of the proposition’s constituents greatly matters 
not only in distinguishing between meaningful strings of symbols and non-
sensical strings, but also in identifying whether two propositions with the 
same constituents are the same or different propositions. For example, the 
English sentence ‘John loves Mary’ expresses the same proposition as the 
Tagalog ‘Mahal ni John si Mary’, since structurally both have the same 
ordered set <loving, John, Mary>. But the sentence ‘Mary loves John’ 
expresses a different proposition from these two, since the proposition it 
expresses has a different structural ordering. Various accounts of the order-
ing relation are found in Schiffer (2012); King (2019); McGrath and Frank 
(2018); Hanks (2009). 
 While it is the majority position that propositions are structured, the great 
diversity in accounts of the nature of their parts opens a window onto what 
an account of propositions must explain (Briggs and Jago 2012; Chalmers 
2012). Are propositions made up of symbols? Names? Abstracta? Possibilia? 
Intensions or meanings (King 2019)? Mental entities of some kind? Whichever 
is correct, surely any theory of the nature of propositions must include a 
theory of the nature of the parts and of the relation of parts to the whole.  
• It will explain the apparently close relation between propositions 
and states of affairs 
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 Propositions cannot be states of affairs such as ‘Snow’s being white’ be-
cause there are no false states of affairs. It certainly seems that true and false 
propositions do not differ in their nature as propositions but only in their 
relation to how the world is. States of affairs are ways the world actually is 
and lack the mental or interpretive aspect of propositions. Nevertheless, it is 
surely not a coincidence that true propositions like ‘Snow is white’ have a 
structure that mirrors that of the corresponding state of affairs (and the 
structure of a false proposition can mirror that of a possible but non-actual 
state of affairs). It is desirable to have some explanation of that. 
• It will accomplish those tasks without reliance on philosophical 
notions which threaten to be as obscure than the explanandum 
 We aim for something more ambitious than accounts of propositions 
that take for granted concepts like ‘representation’, ‘content of concepts’, 
‘reference’, ‘intentionality’, ‘correspondence’, ‘information’, ‘third realm’ or 
‘object of’. The problem is that those notions span the mental and the extra-
mental in ways as mysterious as propositions themselves. 
 Leading contemporary mentalist theories of propositions have not at-
tempted to do that. Soames’s theory of propositions as ‘cognitive event 
types’ (Soames 2010) relies on a primitive notion of representation (Caplan 
2016). Hanks’s theory grounded on primitive ‘acts of predication’ (Hanks 
2015) and Davis’s theory grounded on ‘declarative thought-types’ (Davis 
2005, 20–23) suffer this ‘ungroundedness’ problem. 
 We do not claim there is anything wrong with those notions, as philo-
sophical interpretations of a causal story. Indeed, we will argue that prop-
ositions as we understand them do represent and their terms do refer. The 
objection is to taking those notions as primitive. We aim to give a free-
standing causal account of the mental entities that play the role of propo-
sitions, with those entities arising in a way that does not rely on those 
notions. They can then be subject to an external philosophical analysis us-
ing notions such as representation and content. 
• Platonism will be a philosophy of last resort 
 For Fregeans, the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structured 
relation of senses, where these senses correspond to the constituents of the 
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sentence expressing them. ‘Senses’ are not mental entities (a thesis dubbed 
‘psychologism’ by Frege) but abstracta—the ‘realm-mates of Platonic prop-
erties and relations’ (Jubien 2001, 47; a clear account of the Fregean picture 
is found in Hanks 2015, 12–20). ‘Abstract’ here means ‘abstract object’ in 
the sense of full-blooded Platonism: non-spatial and causally inefficacious, 
as are numbers on a Platonist view (Rosen 2020). But Platonism in general 
labours under the weight of over two thousand years’ worth of substantial 
objections such as its incompatibility with naturalism and its difficulties 
with epistemic access. In the context of propositions in particular, Frege’s 
notion of their ‘graspability’ by the mind was always recognised as difficult 
and was a prime focus of attack by leaders of the (naturalist) ‘cognitive 
turn’ in analytic philosophy. (Sacchi 2006) 
 Platonism is a metaphysics of last resort—understandable if still prob-
lematic with apparently eternal objects like numbers, but surely even less 
attractive concerning entities like meanings that are so closely related to 
human utterances and intentions. 
• A naturalist, anti-Platonist theory of propositions will make essen-
tial reference to the causal origins of propositions 
 Just as biology is incomprehensible without evolution, and a naturalist 
philosophy of mathematics would require explanation of how mathematical 
knowledge can arise in minds, so a non-Platonist theory of propositions 
requires an account of how they come to be. If propositions are not abstracta 
or other entities ‘out there’ and they play some role in cognition, they must 
fit into a causal, scientific story. Thus, we regard purely philosophical men-
talist accounts of propositions such as Davis (2005), Soames (2010) and 
Hanks (2015) as incomplete though valuable. Instead, we will connect our 
theory with causal theories of reference (Devitt and Sterelny 1999), symbol 
grounding in Artificial Intelligence (Harnad 1990) and perceptual symbols 
in cognitive science (Barsalou 1999). We will argue however that by keeping 
to the correct level of analysis we do not need to delve into details of neu-
roscience. 
• A naturalist, anti-Platonist theory of propositions will maintain 
continuity between human and higher animal belief 
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 Although we cannot defend it at length here, our approach accepts that 
(some) propositional attitudes are in the first instance pre-linguistic, and so 
exist in higher animals and human neonates. As Fodor writes, ‘You can, 
surely, believe that it's raining even if you don't speak any language at all. 
To say this is to say that at least some human cognitive psychology gener-
alizes to infra-human organisms; if it didn’t, we would find the behavior of 
animals utterly bewildering, which we don’t.’ (Fodor 1978, 512; at length 
in Nelson 1983) The basic causal mechanisms we discuss will be shared with 
higher animals. 
• Finally, the theory will then show how the entities identified as 
propositions fulfil the traditional roles of propositions as truth-
bearers, objects of belief and other propositional attitudes, and 
relata of logical relations. 
 This is the main task of any theory that purports to account for the 
nature of propositions. 
 To summarise the discussion so far and prepare for the next section, we 
present a classification diagram of theories of propositions. (Fig 1) Our the-







Figure 1: Classification of theories of propositions 
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The diagram will be referred to later in explaining the categories of the 
mental entities being discussed. 
3. Propositions as mental entities? 
 So, why believe that propositions are mental entities? Soames notes that 
there is something unsatisfactory about the project of trying to place prop-
ositions ‘out there’ away from minds. He writes, 
The key to solving [the problem] is to recognize the obvious fact 
that predication is something that agents do… Instead of explain-
ing the intentionality of the cognitive activity of agents in terms 
of an imagined conceptually prior intentionality of the proposi-
tions they entertain, we must explain the intentionality of prop-
ositions in terms of the genuine conceptually prior intentionality 
of the cognitive activity of agents who entertain them (King, 
Soames, and Speaks 2014, 33).  
 This agent-, mind-dependent nature of propositions is something that Pla-
tonist and other theories such as physicalist and possible-worlds theories have 
not accounted for satisfactorily. Propositions are bearers of meanings, and 
there is no getting past the fact that meaning is something intentional; some-
thing with a social aspect, certainly, but mediated through individual minds. 
 The mentalist option should therefore be revisited, despite the prima 
facie problems it faces. The dialectic for our view is simple. Since proposi-
tions are not ‘out there’, then they must be at least partly ‘in here’, or 
mental. Furthermore, since propositional attitudes like belief are mental, it 
would simplify matters if propositions were as well—the Platonist problems 
with relations between minds and abstracta would be avoided if propositions 
were ‘inside’ the mind. 
 But there is an obvious problem. Can we explain how two people can 
believe the same proposition? If a proposition is just in one individual’s 
mind, as a token mental entity, then the proposition is not shareable. But 
the point was that propositions are shareable. Two people can both believe 
that Great Britain is a monarchy. Mental entities are private; propositions 
are, if not exactly on public display, at least interpersonally available. 
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 On the other hand, while mental tokens are private, mental types can 
be shared. As such, these mental types can thus be treated as scientifically 
acceptable entities. To be more precise, the properties defining the type are 
shareable, while the tokens of the type are not. That possibility opens an 
opportunity for progress. 
 In order to maintain clarity about the nature of the mental entities to 
be discussed, we begin with several necessary distinctions, as laid out in the 
bottom right of Fig 1. A mental entity, such as a belief, may be either 
occurrent (a ‘datable mental act’, Textor 2017) or persistent (an underlying 
accessible mental structure that is activated as required, as when one is said 
to believe Pythagoras’s Theorem even when one is not thinking about it.) 
The nature of mental life is for occurrent mental acts to be caused by some 
process such as perception, then persistent traces to be laid down in a pro-
cess of learning. 
 A mental entity may also be token or type: my occurrent enjoyment of 
warmth is of a type with yours, while my persistent love of summer is also 
of a type with yours. It is important that the occurrent/persistent distinc-
tion is not the same as the token/type distinction. (It is also possible to 
distinguish between type and property—a species of birds is a type defined 
by possessing the properties characteristic of that species (Wetzel 2018, sec. 
3)—but that distinction does not play an important role here.)  
 Should a mentalist theory aim to analyse persistent or occurrent prop-
ositions? Existing mentalist theories have preferred occurrent propositions. 
Soames (2010) uses mental event types, Hanks (2015, 6) similarly takes 
propositions to be types of ‘mental and spoken actions’, Davis’s (2005, 20–
23) ‘declarative thought-types’ are occurrent ones. We think, in accordance 
with the causal story to be told below, that long-term, persistent or dispo-
sitional, propositions (bottom right of Fig 1, shaded) are primary and oc-
current thoughts or expressions of them are secondary and transitory. Prop-
ositions, like the terms such as names that are their constituents, should be 
persistent entities in the first instance which account for the unity of the 
event types that express them; so, their expressions in mental events such 
as predications are secondary. 
 However, we do not deny that the entities in the three other quadrants 
exist, nor that they can be rightly said to be true, or believed; one can 
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occurrently believe or speak truly. We will indeed defend a mentalist ana-
logue of Hanks’ claim that ‘linguistic types inherit their semantic properties 
from their tokens.’ (Hanks 2011, 41) That is natural since we begin with a 
causal story, and causes produce tokens—but ones with reliable properties 
since by and large like causes produce like effects, and it is those properties 
that account for their fulfilling the role of propositions. 
4. Propositions as mental entities coordinated  
by cognitive algorithms 
 Propositions should be a kind of thing satisfying barely compatible re-
quirements. They should be in some sense mentally dependent, but in order 
to be shareable they should not be individual (token) thoughts. They should 
be objective, yet neither denizens of the world of physical states of affairs 
nor of a world of abstracta.  
4.1 Propositions as types of persistent mental entities 
 One possibility for the kind of thing that could in principle satisfy those 
requirements is a property of mental entities (and hence the type defined 
by the property). Properties, although sometimes called ‘abstract’, are not 
abstract objects in a Platonic realm, lacking causal power. On the contrary, 
things act in virtue of the properties they have, as when we see something 
as yellow because yellow things affect us in a certain way. One might well 
take an Aristotelian (anti-Platonist) realist view of properties (Armstrong 
1978), but here we do not commit ourselves to any particular metaphysics 
of properties. We need only the scientific acceptability of causal properties 
and their powers, as when we observe that Newton’s law of gravitation relates 
(the properties) gravitation, mass and distance, or Weber’s law relates stim-
ulus (in general) to perception (in general). Properties as we discuss them will 
be understood in that minimal scientific and naturalist sense, according to 
which particulars have causal powers in virtue of the properties they have. 
 Strangely, Frege’s own arguments for his Platonist position do not rule 
out this possibility. He argues concerning the ‘thought’ or what we would 
call the content of a proposition: 
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Is a thought an idea? If the thought I express in the Pythagorean 
theorem can be recognized by others just as much as by me then 
it does not belong to the content of my consciousness, I am not its 
bearer … If every thought requires a bearer, to the contents of 
whose consciousness it belongs, then it would be a thought of this 
bearer only and there would be no science common to many … So 
the result seems to be: thoughts are neither things of the outer 
world nor ideas. A third realm must be recognized (Frege 1956, 
301–2). 
 That is correct, but to conclude that if something is neither a physical 
object nor an occurrent idea, then it must be a Platonic abstract object 
neglects certain other possibilities. Properties of mental entities are another, 
and, as we have explained, they are not abstracta (as they have causal 
powers, like the properties of physical objects). Properties of mental entities 
satisfy Frege’s desiderata for ‘thoughts’, that they be apprehensible by 
many minds because they belong ‘neither to my inner world as an [occur-
rent, particular] idea nor yet to the outer world of material, perceptible 
things’ (Hanks 2015, 3–4). 
 My (occurrent) thought of cats and your thought of cats are numerically 
different mental entities, one in my mind and one in yours. But they can 
have properties in common. For example, they can occur at the same time, 
and they can both be partially caused by perceptual experience of cats. So, 
in principle, my thought and your thought could have a property (or stand 
in a relation) that makes them (tokens of) the same proposition. But what 
property, and how is that property acquired? It needs to be a property 
anchored in the ‘out there’ (like the causation of perception by real cats), 
that gives the two thoughts, yours and mine, in some way a sufficiently 
similar relation to external states of affairs. ‘Out there’ should mean, in 
naturalist fashion, out there in the real physical and social world, not out 
there in a Fregean Platonic ‘third realm’ causally detached from the real 
physical and social world. 
 A beginning on explaining how this is possible is made by a propositional 
theory of perception, such as that of Armstrong’s Perception and the Phys-
ical World. Armstrong writes: 
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Physical objects or happenings stimulate our sense organs. As a 
causal result of this we acquire immediate knowledge of their  
existence and their properties … This knowledge is not necessarily 
verbalized knowledge, but it is always knowledge which it is log-
ically possible to put verbally. It is propositional in form... The 
acquiring of immediate knowledge in this way is perception (Arm-
strong 1961, 191). 
 That is of no immediate help in analysing what propositions are: since 
it analyses perception in terms of propositions, it leaves propositions them-
selves unanalysed. But it does suggest that, if some independent account 
can be given of how perception creates mental entities, the entities so cre-
ated can fulfil the role of propositions (at least, those propositions stating 
claims about perceived reality). In particular, since everyone’s perceptual 
apparatus is set up by biological causes to be similar, there will normally 
result a high degree of commonality between the results of my perception 
and yours (of the same thing). If the results of perception are propositions, 
then it will have been explained how the mental entities common to our 
believing a proposition do have properties in common: they are caused by 
the same perceptual object affecting the mind through a similar causal pro-
cess. 
4.2 Cluster analysis to generate atomic perceptual  
propositions 
 We begin by separating the case of propositions about immediate per-
ceptual reality from others, such as inferred propositions and ones believed 
on the basis of testimony. That is in accordance with the long philosophical 
tradition from the Aristotelian ‘nothing in the intellect that was not first in 
the senses’ through Locke to Carnap’s Aufbau. It is also in accordance with 
much recent philosophy of language. As Devitt and Sterelny put it,  
A causal theory of natural kind terms, like one for names, divides 
in two. First, there must be a theory of reference fixing, which 
explains how a term is linked to a referent in the first place … 
Second, there must be a theory of reference borrowing, which 
explains the social transmission of a term to those having no con-
tact with its referent (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 88). 
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 That applies to propositions as much as to the terms in them. There are 
good reasons for that separation into two levels. The understandability of 
‘It’s sunny in California’ is parasitic on the understandability of ‘It’s sunny 
here’. If we can grasp the nature of immediate perceptual propositions, we 
can hope to move on to others which stand in a logically dependent relation 
to them (such as logical combinations of immediate perceptual propositions, 
or merely possible ones, or reported ones). 
 The two-level approach is also suggested by the commonality of percep-
tual recognition to us and nonhuman primates. The ability to form pre-
symbols out of perceptual input is found in the higher primates, but appar-
ently not the compositionality and inference of human language (Zuber-
bühler 2018), nor reference to more distant or abstract entities. As Witt-
genstein neatly puts the two stages, ‘A dog believes his master is at the 
door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after tomorrow?’ 
(Wittgenstein 1953, 174; discussion in DeGrazia 1994) Therefore, it would 
be desirable if the most basic account of what a proposition-like entity is 
could rely only on what is possible for the primate mind, leaving more com-
plex operations peculiar to humans for a later stage. 
 Certainly, achieving an independent account of perceptual grounding 
has proved very difficult, both at the in-principle level desired by philosophy 
and at the more detailed level required by cognitive science (and even more 
so, at the implementable level sought by Artificial Intelligence). The exten-
sive work in those areas has however produced some models that are useful 
in demonstrating how a mental entity such as one whose properties play 
the role of a term or proposition could be at once internal to the mind, 
caused by an appropriate part of physical reality, and endowed with prop-
erties shareable by other minds. We will use the simple example of cluster 
analysis as applied to the symbol grounding problem (Franklin 1996). This 
is not simply an example or metaphor, but an exercise in abstract task 
analysis to identify what must be done, minimally, to create an atomic 
perceptual proposition. 
 Corresponding to the old philosophical problem of how words get their 
meaning, cognitive scientists address the ‘symbol grounding problem’ (Har-
nad 1990). In an Artificial Intelligence system intended to perform tasks 
like computer vision, how can the internal symbols which are to represent 
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pieces of external reality actually be attached to and caused by the percep-
tual input from that reality? In the vast flux of changing pixel values input 
to a vision system, how is the relevant part to be identified and labelled so 
that the system locates and tracks an object? The problem is not simply a 
technical one: here the main interest is in the task specification and in un-
derstanding the kind of algorithm that could possibly solve it, along with 
the nature of the result. (The distinction between task specification and 
algorithm is that a task specification states what output is to be created 
from what input—‘make a chocolate cake from these ingredients’; ‘sort a 
list of words into alphabetical order’—while a recipe or algorithm lists the 
steps to accomplish the task—a definite cake recipe for the cake; for sorting, 
an algorithm such as bubble sort which repeatedly goes through the list and 
swaps adjacent items if they are in the wrong order.) 
 Cluster analysis works like this. Its purpose is to take a heap of points 
as in Fig. 2 (that is, it is just given unlabelled points with their positions), 
and to conclude ‘There are two clusters, and these points are in cluster A 
and those are in cluster B.’ To the eye, it is easy, but finding and program-













Figure 2: Points in two clusters1 
 
1  Figure adapted from: http://www.philender.com/courses/multivari-
ate/notes2/cluster0.html.  
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 The main application of cluster analysis is to ‘points’ that are not in 
geometrical space but in ‘feature space’ (as in Fig. 3, but typically the space 
has many dimensions). The axes represent features of objects and the degree 
to which objects possess them. So, a dot placed in the space represents an 








Figure 3: Clusters of points in feature space3 
 For a vision system (artificial, animal or human) to recognise an object 
against background requires a form of cluster analysis: the pixels in the 
object, which are similar to one another in both position and colour, need 
to be ‘stuck together’ by the system’s software to create the ‘object’ cluster, 
while being separated from the ‘background’ cluster of pixels. 
 Then once one has an individual cat (say) cut out of the background 
and identified as a single object, one must perform cluster analysis again 
(in feature space) to recognise that cats are similar to one another and dogs 
are similar to one another (across a range of features) and there is not much 
in between. Hence, there are recognisable natural kinds: cat and dog. 
 
2  For a technical survey, see (Jain, Murty, and Flynn 1999). 
3  Figure adapted from: http://2.bp.blog-
spot.com/_CWYkOgzhyq0/TAJ4oFopasI/AAAAAAAAADo/NRrS4E3R1cs/s400/
cluster_analysis_income_debt.gif. 
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 How similar inputs have to be (and similar in what ways) to count as 
in the same cluster is something that the clustering algorithm has to work 
out for itself. Cluster analysis is an exercise in discretisation—different 
points in a continuous input space end up classified into a single discrete 
cluster. Whether different perceivers can recognise sufficiently similar clus-
ters given their somewhat different perceptual inputs is a matter for scien-
tific investigation. The fact that communication using perceptually-gener-
ated concepts often succeeds suggests that they do. It is easy to think of 
the difficulties of classifying handwritten postcode digits, but software exists 
which does almost perfectly classify them into ten classes. 
 It is not merely that cluster analysis might be helpful for the problems 
of early perceptual grouping and of symbol grounding, but that the nature 
of the problems means that any solution to them must be some form of 
cluster analysis. Such problems all involve forming a discrete object out of 
a cluster, that is, a mass of neighbouring data points that are all close 
among themselves, but are all reasonably well separated from other data 
points.  
 A clustering algorithm is a perfectly comprehensible series of steps, a 
recipe implementable in software—whether software written by humans in 
an AI system or the mental implementation of such an algorithm in the 
human mind, however that is accomplished (and because we are working at 
the level of task specifications and algorithms, the theory can remain neu-
tral on the mechanisms by which that is in fact accomplished). An imple-
mented algorithm is a naturalistically acceptable entity, not an inhabitant 
of a Platonic world: it is just a series of regular scientifically-discoverable 
steps with inputs and outputs, like the process of photosynthesis. The algo-
rithm does not contain any philosophical overhead such as ‘representation’ 
or ‘content’. 
 Nevertheless, its output consists of discrete items that it would be nat-
ural for the outside observer to recognise as uncannily resembling terms and 
propositions. The clusters identified by the algorithm in the flow of experi-
ence are labels of naturally grouped persistent objects. While the algorithm 
requires some structured input—the inflow of perceptual input must have 
some inhomogeneities actually present, and the feature dimensions are also 
given—the objects have been discovered in the data by the algorithm, not 
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presented to it beforehand. Nevertheless, we can find in its output items 
bearing a resemblance to all of the constituents of an atomic proposition 
Fa. The ‘subject’ a is a cluster found in the points (the pixel positions and 
values, for example, clumped by the cluster algorithm to form natural dis-
crete objects such as spot against background). The predicate F is a region 
of feature space; for example, the bottom left cluster in Fig. 3 lies in the 
low-income region of space. (That does require that the system has the 
capability to represent explicitly dimensions of feature space and their 
parts; we do not attempt to solve that problem here.) The outside observer 
is welcome to use the language of representation, so as to agree with Fodor’s 
‘there are internal representations and propositional attitudes are relations 
that we bear to them.’ (Fodor 1978, 519) But representation is an interpre-
tation of what has arisen from the algorithm, not something assumed or 
input at the start. 
 The proposition is the (persistent type) association between cluster and 
region, that is, the output of the clustering algorithm identifying the cluster 
and where it lies in feature space. One must distinguish between the points 
in the cluster actually being in that region (a state of affairs in the real world), 
and the clustering software’s explicit identification of the cluster as being in 
that region (an output of the software). It is the latter that is a proposition. 
As it is a type, produced similarly in different correctly-functioning minds, it 
can be common to different minds. In a pre-linguistic animal, there is no more 
to belief in a perceptual proposition than the algorithmic output (which 
should be sufficient for action on the basis of that belief). Humans may, as is 
their wont, add some conscious thoughts and linguistic expressions, but those 
are not essential to the belief in the proposition. 
 As with any implemented software, a system performing clustering can 
be analysed at three levels of abstraction. At the lowest level is the working 
implementation (code running on a machine, in the computer case; working 
neurobiology, in the human case). At the next level is the algorithm: the 
recipe or sequence of steps that is implemented in the code or neural activ-
ity. At the highest level is the task analysis or program specification, which 
describes what the algorithm is to do (in terms of transforming inputs to 
outputs) without laying down the steps it is to perform to do it. Different 
algorithms (such as different clustering algorithms) may perform the same 
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task (such as identifying natural clusters in data). For the purpose of iden-
tifying propositions, the important level of analysis is the highest, that of 
specifying the clusters (of objects and kinds) formed by the perceptual clus-
tering. Thus, if Martians have a different algorithm for perception, but 
identify the same clusters in data, such as cats and mats, their proposition 
‘the cat sat on the mat’ is the same proposition as ours, in virtue of their 
algorithm satisfying the same program specification as ours.4 
 The same—task analysis—level is appropriate for deciding whether two 
people believe the same proposition, such as ‘the cat sat on the mat,’ on 
the basis of their slightly differing perceptual experiences. The aim of per-
ceptual algorithms is exactly to create persistent discrete unities out of the 
continuous flux of perceptual experience. It may succeed exactly, approxi-
mately, or not at all, and whether it does so the same way in two perceivers 
is a scientific question to be examined in the usual ways, such as by checking 
how similar are their inferences, answers and behaviour on the basis of the 
proposition believed. 
 Although task analysis or program specification is an obvious sense ‘more 
abstract’ than lower levels, it does not follow that it involves any naturalisti-
cally unacceptable abstracta. Just as photosynthesis has a more efficient im-
plementation pathway in tropical plants than in temperate-zone ones but still 
effects the same biochemical transformation (without calling on any non-nat-
uralist entities), so different cognitive algorithms may perform the same cog-
nitive task, such as creating atomic perceptual propositions. 
4.3 Properties of perceptual propositions generated  
by cluster analysis 
 It is not difficult to read off answers, in that model, to some of the 
troubling questions about propositions described earlier—at least for atomic 
propositions that summarise perceptual input. 
 As to the metaphysical nature of a proposition, it is an explicit internal 
(mental) persistent discrete entity, generated by internal algorithms acting 
 
4  The separation of levels of analysis is less clear in the ‘perceptual symbol systems’ 
of Barsalou (1999), which otherwise attempts a similar causal analysis to the present 
one. 
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(in this case) on perceptual input. ‘Explicit’ does not mean ‘conscious’—the 
mind’s insight into its own workings is notoriously weak—but instead 
means a discrete output of mental processing, capable of entering into fur-
ther processing, and in principle capable of being identified by the sciences 
of psychology and neuroscience. 
 The way in which the mental (persistent) tokens of propositions in dif-
ferent minds are coordinated and share properties follows from their being 
the outputs of identical (or very similar) algorithms run on similar data. 
Just as your cake and mine resemble each other (have similar persistent 
properties) if we use the same recipe on similar ingredients, so your token 
internal proposition that there is a cat before us resembles mine in virtue 
of our having run similar perception-processing clustering algorithms on 
similar visual input. It is true that if your experience of cats is only of white 
ones and mine only of black ones, there may be some mismatch between 
our concepts and thus potential for miscommunication. That is inevitable 
and algorithms can only do so much with the data they are given. 
 Compositionality has been explained above: the terms a and F in the 
proposition Fa are themselves explicit as outputs of the clustering algo-
rithm—they are exactly what the algorithm is designed to output. So is 
their relationship in the proposition. The fact that terms and propositions 
are discrete outputs is what allows them to become inputs in the higher 
levels of discrete processing: for example, to enter into explicit conjunctions 
and other logical composites and to be expressed in discretely structured 
natural languages. At least, it allows that in principle. There are some dif-
ficult questions as to how human cognition, but apparently animal cognition 
only minimally, achieves some explicit knowledge of the representational 
nature of its internal symbols. Those questions are about cognition and not 
directly about the nature of propositions and cannot be addressed here. 
 The relation between proposition and state of affairs is, in this simplest 
case though not necessarily elsewhere, the causal one between data input 
and algorithmic output. The cat’s being on the mat is a state of affairs.5 
The perceptual clustering algorithm identifies discrete objects cat and mat 
 
5  We take a realist approach to states of affairs as defended in (Armstrong 1997) 
and regard them as unproblematic entities in the present context, and as composed 
of particulars and universals as they seem to be. 
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in the visual experiential flux, tagged with their positions in space, com-
puted from the visual directions of their parts. Some further processing, but 
of the same nature, is required to make explicit the spatial relation of cat 
and mat, inherited from the spatial relations of the perceived pixels belong-
ing to each. 
 There is more than one way in which that simple causal relation of 
proposition and state of affairs can become more complicated. Firstly, there 
are many possible ways to go wrong between input and output; any algo-
rithm implemented in real software can malfunction and, for example, out-
put cluster labels when there are really no clusters in the data. In that case, 
there is no state of affairs corresponding to the output. Correspondence is 
thus a relation that may or may not hold between states of affairs and the 
output of the clustering software: there are certain clusters really in the 
data, and the algorithm does or does not successfully find them. No external 
notion of truth has been invoked—correspondence is defined in terms of the 
properties of the data and the software’s performance on the data. Again, the 
contrast between animal and human cognition is useful for understanding 
what has been claimed. An animal’s internal proposition can rightly be said 
to represent external reality, but that is a comment made by an outside hu-
man philosophical observer and is unknown to the animal. Humans have more 
insight into their cognition (we do not claim to have explained how) and their 
awareness of the representational nature of their symbols is useful not only 
philosophically but for such purposes as logical inference. 
 Secondly, there are other possibilities for lack of correspondence—mis-
matches between reality and the outputs of the software − when the dis-
crete outputs of clustering algorithms are used as the inputs of recombina-
tions. Human mental capacities, though apparently not cockroach mental 
capacities, include explicit recombination of the discrete chunks. ‘a is red’ 
and ‘b is blue’ permit the recombination ‘a is blue’6; ‘X loves Y’ permits the 
recombination ‘Y loves X’. This ‘systematicity’ of thought was adduced in 
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated (1988) paper as being incompatible with 
a connectionist architecture for the mind; certainly, it points to the require-
ment that discrete recombinable entities should be found at a basic level in 
 
6  Provided that ‘red’ and ‘blue’ are recognised as in the same category, something 
which itself needs to be a capacity of the software. 
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thought. The ability to ‘mix and match’ items is essential in exploring 
‘what-if’ scenarios—thought experiments where humans imagine what 
would happen in situations that have not occurred yet, or ‘mental time 
travel’ (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007). It is the foundation of the human 
ability to plan. Recombination of (categorically compatible) terms yields 
something that might be the output of the clustering algorithm applied to 
some possible state of affairs. Or again, it might not, if the recombination 
yields an impossible state of affairs: there is no guarantee that recombina-
tion of mental items tracks what is really compossible in the outside world. 
A third way in which the relation of proposition and state of affairs may 
become more complicated arises when the proposition is more logically 
complex than an atomic Fa or Gxy. Those ways cannot be described in 
detail here. An example is that the relation of the truth-functionally com-
plex proposition ‘Fa and Gy’ to states of affairs can be explained as in-
herited from the relations of Fa and of Gy to states of affairs; that is the 
point of the connective ‘and’. Another story can be told about proposi-
tions with complexity like ‘X believes that p’, but clarification can be left 
until an account is given of how propositions fulfil roles such as objects of 
belief. 
 Not mentioned so far is any conscious mental content. It is not denied 
that there may be such qualia as feelings of aboutness or cognitive satisfac-
tion when one entertains propositions. However, just as qualia of blue and 
red are not an essential part of the story of human perceptual discrimination 
between blue and red—which may take place without or before any such 
conscious sensation, even if such qualia exist—so the essential mental en-
tity, the proposition, can perform its cognitive role whether or not accom-
panied by any qualia or awareness. 
4.4 Propositions other than perceptual 
 It is of course not claimed that clustering algorithms applied to percep-
tion can perform an indefinitely large range of knowledge-generation tasks. 
Early perceptual grouping and object identification form a restricted range 
of knowledge, albeit a crucial and foundational one. Clustering is just a first 
and easily understood example, where the relation of input to output can 
be studied free of complications. 
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 However, a good deal is known at least in principle about the generation 
of non-perceptual propositions from perceptual ones. In developmental psy-
chology, for example, evidence on the production of more inferential 
knowledge, such as research on ‘Bayesian babies’, suggests that humans 
share inbuilt algorithms for inferential knowledge too (Denison, Reed, and 
Xu 2013). Something was said above about the human ability to speak of 
merely possible states of affairs through recombination. In the philosophy 
of language, much has been said about how the social nature of language 
(once the developing infant has inferred that a world of other minds exists 
out there) allows for one person to ‘catch’ propositions from another (Devitt 
and Sterelny 1999, 96–101). These abilities—apparently very minimal in 
animals—create a great variety of propositions. They require complex sto-
ries as to how they refer to reality (or fail to), but there is no reason to 
think they require a different account of the nature of propositions. If we 
understand the nature of perceptual propositions, recombinations of them 
and their parts are not particularly mysterious in principle. 
 Propositions involving reference to fictional and abstract entities also 
need their own story. Again, animals and probably human neonates seem 
unable to entertain such propositions, confirming the desirability of a two-
stage approach that starts with perceptual propositions, and suggesting that 
such questions do not concern the nature of propositions but the nature of 
those entities. We agree with the argument of Moltmann (2013) that refer-
ence to abstract entities is both special and rare. No doubt the ability to 
refer to fictions and abstracta is a development of the ability to recombine. 
For example, the recognition that ‘a is red’ and ‘b is blue’ permit the re-
combination ‘a is blue’ can suggest detaching ‘blue’ as an entity in itself 
which can be the subject of propositions. If our theory satisfactorily covers 
the nature of propositions in animals and neonates, its extension to the 
range of sophisticated entities discussed by adult humans is a matter for 
special investigations on those topics. 
 As pointed out by McDaniel (2005), any realist theory of propositions 
also needs an account of propositions that have never been and will never 
be entertained by anyone. That is easy for Platonist theories—they all exist 
in the same way as entertained propositions—but harder for mentalist or 
linguistic theories. We argue that, as for the question of propositions about 
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abstract entities, it is a problem, but not one about the nature of proposi-
tions. It is a problem about the nature of uninstantiated properties. Just as 
the reality (or otherwise) of an uninstantiated shade of blue is a problem 
about the metaphysics of properties (Franklin 2015) rather than a problem 
in the science of colour, so unentertained propositions (on a mentalist view) 
is a problem about the uninstantiated in general rather than about propo-
sitions. 
 However, an analogy will explain why the problem of unentertained 
propositions should not be regarded as serious for a naturalist account. Let 
us consider the corpus of programs written in some computer language; for 
definiteness let us take an obsolete one such as FORTRAN V, in which a 
finite number of programs were written but which is no longer used. Sup-
pose we are comparing two philosophies of the nature of computer pro-
grams. A Platonist one holds that computer programs (in all languages 
actual and possible) exist in a Platonic heaven, and an infinitesimal propor-
tion of them are written down by some programmer. An alternative natu-
ralist philosophy holds that computer programs are creations of program-
mers, even though it is an objective matter which of the symbol strings 
written down are well-formed FORTRAN V programs. A program is an 
actual string of symbols created by a person (or machine), and it is a well-
formed FORTRAN V program if it follows certain rules. The Platonist will 
urge the “problem of unwritten FORTRAN V programs” as an objection 
to the naturalist theory. How serious is that objection? 
 It is not a serious objection. Many natural processes are generative of 
possibilities that are never realised. Darwinian evolution could generate 
many species other than those actually found in the history of life on earth, 
while organic chemistry could generate many compounds other than those 
it actually does. That is no reason to think that species or organic com-
pounds are really Platonic entities. The Platonist does believe that any 
species or compound, actual or possible, reflects some Platonic archetype, 
but for the naturalist who rejects that on general metaphysical grounds, 
there is no further “problem of unrealised species/compounds/programs”. 
Those are just latent (and predictable) possibilities of the natural generative 
process. It is the same with propositions: given a naturalist story of how 
entertained ones are formed, such as has been presented here, the process 
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has natural generative possibilities for further propositions that may not 
ever be entertained. But that is not a reason to reject a naturalist process. 
 The case of false propositions is considered below; false propositions, 
even perceptual ones, cannot be directly caused by perceivable reality. 
5. Coordination of propositions between minds  
via game theory 
 Before turning to the question of how the mental entities that have been 
identified as propositions fulfil the roles initially laid down for propositions, 
such as being truth-bearers and objects of belief, one further issue needs to 
be addressed, namely the coordination of propositions between different be-
lievers (human believers, if not animal ones), and the public standing of 
propositions. Although it has been explained how (tokens of) propositions 
in different minds can share properties in virtue of being the output of 
similar algorithms on similar data, that still leaves propositions as (types 
of) private entities hidden in minds. How can they acquire sufficient public 
standing to allow communication? How can there be reliable coordination 
between propositions in different minds, so that standard communication 
cues like words and gestures reliably induce the same proposition (type) in 
different minds? That is a further task, which it seems that humans can do 
but animals cannot—cats can discretise perceptual input in a similar way 
to humans (that is a minimal requirement for recognising conspecifics and 
prey, which higher animals can do), but they do not appear to coordinate 
their internal propositions with other cats. 
 As a simple model for how that is possible, and possible for the sort of 
mental entities that have been identified as propositions by the theory being 
put forward here, consider the stability of strategies in game theory. In an 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the tit-for-tat strategy is a stable equi-
librium. The game has two players, with a simultaneous choice at each step 
between two moves, ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’. If both cooperate, the payoff 
is better for both than if both defect, but a temptation to defect results 
from the rule that if one player cooperates and the other defects, the de-
fecting player is well rewarded and the cooperating player punished. The 
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tit-for-tat strategy (play the move that the other player played in the last 
round) permits cooperation to develop, to the benefit of both players, but 
avoids the perils of being played for a sucker time after time. The game is 
mentally dependent, in the sense that a round of play occurs as a result of 
the players’ intentions to play it (and of each player’s knowing that the 
other has such an intention). It is an objective, mind-independent fact, 
however, that tit-for-tat is the best way to play it—the way that leads 
reliably to the best outcome for each player in the medium to long term—
so that rational players will tend towards that strategy. That strategy will 
then typically be observed to be implemented in the game (if the players 
are indeed rational): it will be observed that plays do agree with the move 
chosen by the other player in the previous round, and questioning may elicit 
agreement from the players that they are following that strategy. There is 
a mental type whose tokens in each player mean they are both playing tit-
for-tat. Neither a pattern observed in the sequence of moves nor an inten-
tion to follow such a pattern is normally thought to require the existence of 
any Platonic entity such as an ‘abstract strategy’. There are no entities 
metaphysically more mysterious than instantiated patterns and the inten-
tions of individuals. 
 The analogy between game-theoretic strategies and the interpersonal 
coordination of propositions is closer than it looks. To speak minimally and 
somewhat naively: propositions can typically be expressed in language, and 
one main purpose of doing so is to communicate. Communication is, among 
other things, a game-theoretic exercise. When a speaker enunciates a sign 
with the intention that the hearer should read it as a sign and take it in a 
certain way, the hearer’s move in the cooperative communication game in-
volves his guessing the way in which the speaker intends the sign to be 
taken. It is an iterated game, so the history of cues that have worked is 
relevant to future moves. Thus, public language coordinates the induction 
of propositions across minds. (This is similar to the philosophy of commu-
nication of Lewis (1969), and Grice’s (1989, chap. 2) ‘cooperative’ principle 
of conversation, needed to allow a hearer to infer what a speaker intends 
from the speaker’s public utterance.) That does not imply, however, that 
the tokens of propositions themselves are public or somehow in the external 
world. Like the intention to play a round of a game, the token proposition 
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is a mental entity, but communication is possible because of the coordina-
tion of mental entities driven by the game of communication. 
6. How propositions as algorithmically coordinated mental  
entities fulfil the traditional roles of propositions 
 It remains to be explained how this theory of propositions—mental en-
tities sharing properties through their creation by common algorithms and 
coordinated by game-theoretic communication requirements—accounts for 
the roles of the proposition, as listed in the first section above. 
 Their role as truth-bearers follows from what has been said about corre-
spondence. An implementation of an algorithm to find the real clusters in 
perceptual data can succeed or fail in doing so, whence the result can be 
called true or false. (Allowable) recombination of the discrete outputs of the 
algorithm—the terms of a potential proposition − creates an internal prop-
osition that could be the output of the algorithm applied to some possible 
state of affairs; the recombination is true or false according as that state of 
affairs obtains or not. 
 Propositions as conceived here are the objects of belief because they are 
actually identified with (implicit, dispositional) beliefs. There is nothing to 
the implicit belief that p over and above its having been installed in the 
mind by the belief-creating algorithm; which in the simplest case is the 
clustering algorithm applied to perception. (Of course, inferred beliefs need 
a further account of the process creating them out of immediate beliefs, but 
that does not bear on the nature of propositions itself.) Explicit, occurrent 
beliefs, such as consciously entertained or linguistically expressed ones, are 
created by the mysterious process by which the human mind can reflect on 
and bring to consciousness some of its contents. How that happens is again 
not directly relevant to the nature of propositions. 
 The story about the origin of propositions does not involve language in 
any essential way, so it has been explained in principle how propositions 
can be the meanings common to sentences of different languages. The clus-
tering algorithm is independent of language—indeed, it is a precondition of 
the learnability of language. For an infant to associate the sound ‘cat’ with 
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experiences of cats, it must have solved four perceptual discretatision or 
clustering problems first: (1) It has to cut individual cats out of the visual 
background, (2) it has to classify those objects as (potentially) a single kind, 
then (3) it has to segment the sound stream so that the syllable ‘cat’ is 
isolated, and finally, (4) it has to classify that occurrence of ‘cat’ with other 
occurrences of that syllable. Only after that can there be association be-
tween the syllable-type ‘cat’ and experience of the type cats. Thus, organ-
ising perceptual experience into discrete repeatable pieces has to take place 
before questions about the meaning of words can even arise. It is to be 
expected that linguistic expressions of simple terms and propositions would 
be intertranslatable between different languages, although there is scope for 
different languages to construct different complex concepts from combina-
tions of the simples, resulting in some mismatch of meanings of statements 
in different languages. That is observed to be the case (Wierzbicka 1996). 
 It is harder to explain why propositions as conceived here, as coordi-
nated mental entities, should be the relata of logical relations. It is not clear 
why mental entities, even when tied down and given objectivity by the 
causality of an algorithm or the coordination imposed by the cooperative 
game of communication, should be subject to the absolute, mind-independ-
ent necessity of relations such as logical consequence or logical contrariety. 
The clue lies in the connection between logical relations and truth. As an 
account of the truth of propositions has already been given, in terms of a 
certain kind of correspondence between propositions and states of affairs, 
logical relations should be explained in the same way. A particularly clear 
case is the close connection between the logical consequence relation be-
tween (certain) propositions and the inclusion relation between states of 
affairs. The state of affairs of this raven’s being black is a part of the state 
of affairs of this raven and its neighbour both being black. It is thus impos-
sible for the latter state of affairs to obtain without the former also obtain-
ing. If now a perceptual clustering algorithm (correctly) applies to those 
states of affairs and extracts the propositions that this raven is black and 
that both ravens are black, respectively, then the relation of logical impli-
cation holds between the latter and the former. It ‘mirrors’, so to speak, the 
inclusion relation between the states of affairs, meaning that the inclusion 
relation between the states of affairs is the truthmaker of the fact that it is 
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impossible for the second proposition to be true without the first also being 
true. That is, the latter proposition implies the former. 
 While that is the start of the story, it does not cover all cases. It does 
not explain why the proposition that this raven is white is implied by the 
proposition that this raven and its neighbour are both white, because those 
propositions are false and so do not correspond to any states of affairs, 
hence there is no inclusion relation between states of affairs to act as the 
truthmaker of their logical relation. Nevertheless, the potential for those 
propositions to result from actual states of affairs determines their logical 
relations. This raven’s being white and these two ravens’ being white are 
possible states of affairs, the first of which would be a part of the second, if 
they obtained. Hence, it is impossible that the second should obtain without 
the first, whence the second proposition logically implies the first. 
 Naturally that will create a problem for propositions that purport to 
describe what are in fact impossible states of affairs.  But again, it is not 
the business of the theory of propositions to explain the philosophical com-
plexities of all the things that propositions could (or could not) be about. 
7. Conclusion 
 There is every reason to agree with the tradition that there are such 
things as propositions, entities that fulfil roles such as objects of beliefs and 
relata of logical relations. But there is no reason why the requirement that 
propositions be objective and shareable should lead philosophy on a wild 
goose chase into a Platonic realm of abstracta. Objectivity is available to 
mental entities, via the cognitive algorithms and game-theoretic coordina-
tion strategies that we all share. Those algorithms induce in different minds 
(implicit) beliefs. The beliefs in different minds share properties that allow 
them to fill the roles of propositions. 
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